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Darwinian Selection and Non-existence of Nash Equilibria.
Daniel Eriksson1 and Henrik Jeldtoft Jensen1, ∗
1Department of Mathematics, Imperial College, 180 Queen’s Gate, London SW7 2BZ, U.K.
We study selection acting on phenotype in a collection of agents playing local games lacking Nash
equilibria. After each cycle one of the agents losing most games is replaced by a new agent with new
random strategy and game partner. The network generated can be considered critical in the sense
that the lifetimes of the agents is power law distributed. The longest surviving agents are those with
the lowest absolute score per time step. The emergent ecology is characterized by a broad range of
behaviors. Nevertheless, the agents tend to be similar to their opponents in terms of performance.
PACS numbers: 87.10.+4, 87.23.-n, 02.50.Le, 05.65.+b
It has been argued that biological evolution is driven by
a combination of natural selection and self-organization
[1, 2]. Mutations act at random at the level of genotype
while selection acts at the phenotype. Darwinian selec-
tion is expected to occur because some phenotypes are
more viable than others [3]. The viability or fitness of a
given phenotype is, of course, not an absolute quantity
but depends on context and the environment the pheno-
type is exposed to [4]. The environment (physical as well
as biotic) is to a large extent produced by co-existing
phenotypes, and hence the environment and the corre-
sponding fitness are self-organized emergent properties
of the ecology. Moreover, fitness or vigor is necessarily a
relative quantity. An organism can become so vigorous
that it removes its own foundation of existence; a balance
very relevant e.g. to host-parasite systems. For organ-
isms to be able to coexist for extended periods of time
they need to develop phenotypes which are in a kind of
restrained poise.
Here we analyze Darwinian selection acting on phe-
notype in a model consisting of an adaptive network of
agents of different strategies mutually competing in local
zero-sum games lacking Nash equilibria. We let selection
act by removing the agents with the smallest score (most
negative) after a round of games. Thus the viability of
an agent is a function of his phenotypical behavior in a
specific environment. When the local games are of op-
posing interest with only a single winner we find that the
agents organize into a system where agents are homo-
geneous in terms of success but heterogeneous in terms
of activity. The agents achieve longevity by organizing
themselves in a way that minimize the absolute value of
their score. By this strategy they avoid to be amongst
the worst performers themselves; moreover low absolute
score allows the agents to retain well tuned partners by
not forcing many lost games on to their opponents, which
would lead to the elimination of the partner.
Our model is closely related to previous network mod-
els. Kauffman introduced Boolean networks to study the
relationship between evolution and self-organization [1].
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Collective adaptive agents striving to be among the mi-
nority were studied in mean-field models by Arthur [5]
and Challet and Zhang [6]. Aspects of Darwinian evo-
lution were added to the minority game by Zhang [7].
This line of approach were further developed by Paczuski,
Bassler and Corral (PBC) who considered agents play-
ing the minority game [8]. The goal of agents is to be
among the global minority though they are linked only
to a subset of all the agents. The strategy of the worst
performing agent is randomly changed after each cycle
while the links of the network remain unchanged [8].
Here we modify the model introduced by PBC to a
Local Darwinian Network model (LDN) in which we al-
low agents to play competitive local games and to adapt
their connections as well as their strategies. Viewed from
the perspective of evolutionary ecology it appears to be
more natural to consider agents performing local games
(organisms or species entangled in a web of mutual com-
petitions). The renewal of the properties of the worst
performing agent should be thought of as representing
either the “mutation” of an individual or, if agents are
thought of as representing species, as a species being su-
perseded by an invading species with different affinities.
In either case it is natural to update the set of interaction
links. Further, from a statistical mechanics or complex
systems perspective we expect systems coupled globally
to more readily enter a critical state, hence it is of interest
to explore the criticality of purely local systems.
The LDN net is critical for K = 2 as is the original
Kauffman net [1]. The PBC net is critical for K = 3 [8].
Here K is the number of independent arguments of the
agents’ Boolean strategy functions.
The homogeneity parameter P of an agent measures
the fraction of 0’s and 1’s – whichever is in majority –
in the Boolean output assigned to the K2 distinct input
states of the agent. For K = 2, the homogeneity pa-
rameter is constrained to one of the values 1/2, 3/4 or 1
where in the last case the agent will not switch output
signal at all. In contrast to PBC, we fix the homogeneity
parameter of each agent to 3/4 ensuring that the net-
work is logically entirely homogeneous with respect to
the output of the agents. It follows that any discrepancy
in the switching behavior of two competing agents is of
dynamical origin.
2The model – Consider N agents, each assigned a
Boolean signal Si = 0 or 1, for i = 1, ..., N . The dy-
namics consists of two types of updates: a) the agents
playing rounds of games; b) and the act of Darwinian
selection/mutation.
a) The games are performed in the following way.
Each agent is defined as aggressor (A) of one other ran-
domly assigned agent (thus agents participate on average
in two games) who acts as opponent (O) in a zero sum
game. In each time step A and O compare their Boolean
signals SA and SO. If SA = SO the aggressor A scores
+1 and the opponent scores –1. If SA 6= SO the aggres-
sor A scores –1 and the opponent scores +1. The game
is identical to the simple ”coin guessing” game where one
of two persons is to pick the hand – left or right - that
is holding the coin. The game has the property that,
when considering only pure (non-randomized) strategies,
there exists no Nash equilibrium. No Nash equilibrium
exists in the sense that it will always be possible for either
player to benefit by changing his strategy if the opponent
sticks to his strategy. In our simulations, two agents are
never allowed to act as mutual aggressors in which case
both agents could receive a zero score. Neither do we
allow agents to act as aggressor for themselves. The fact
that agents cannot collaborate in order to achieve neutral
(zero) scores will be referred to as an opposing interests
property of the network.
The signals used for the zero-sum games are generated
in the following way. The output signal at a given time
step Si(t) of agent i is determined deterministically from
the output at the previous time step from K other source
agents Si1(t− 1), Si2(t− 1), ..., SiK (t− 1)
Si(t) = fi(Si1(t− 1), Si2(t− 1), ..., SiK (t− 1)), (1)
where fi is a randomly chosen Boolean function associ-
ated with agent i. For K = 2 the function is such that for
exactly three of the functions four input configurations
({0, 0}, {0, 1}, {1, 0}, {1, 1}) the same Boolean output
is assigned, whereas the signal is different for the fourth
configuration. This ensures P = 3/4.
One can think of a specific choice for the functional
form of fi as the genotype of agent number i. The K
source-agents associated with i can include the opponent
of i but will not include agent i. The source-agents and
the opponents are to be thought of as the environment
of an agent.
For fixed assignments of source-agents as well as ag-
gressor and opponents Eq. 1 is now parallel updated ∀i.
Since the state space of the net is finite and the dynam-
ics is deterministic, periodic orbits will always be reached
(though the maximum length of a period is huge 2N). We
measure the average score per time step of the agents
over a round of games consisting of either simulating the
transient plus one periodic cycle or by performing 104
parallel updates which ever is the shortest. We denote
this sequence of deterministic updates a test cycle. The
score gained by an agent characterizes the success of his
phenotypical behavior.
b) The Darwinian update is done in the following
way. After testing the performance of the agents, the
worst performing agent is replaced by a new agent with a
new Boolean function (i.e., genotype) chosen completely
at random. (In case the worst performance is shared
by more then one agent, then one of them is chosen at
random for replacement.) The new agent is randomly
assigned an opponent and a set of K source-agents. In-
tuitively, this means that agents belonging to ecological
niches that no longer exist are removed from the system,
whereas new candidate niches are sampled fortuitously
by agents who themselves have random properties. How-
ever, the wiring of those agents that attack an agent be-
ing replaced is not changed. These agents now attack the
new agent as we proceed with a new round of games, or
test cycle, as described under a).
In this letter, we use a Non-Darwinian version of the
model as benchmark allowing us to isolate the effect of
the Darwinian updating. In the Non-Darwinian model,
at the end of each test cycle, we randomly pick an agent
for replacement. Agents are in this situation not pun-
ished for performing poorly and are all subject to the
same probability of being replaced.
Results - The initial configuration consists of randomly
assigned input links, Boolean functions and game part-
ners. As the sequence of test cycles and Darwinian re-
placements are repeated the model organizes gradually
into a stationary state. The critical properties of the
network are indicated in Fig. 1 where we exhibit the
probability of the length of transients p(t) and of the
length of periodic attractors p(a) respectively. The dis-
tributions do exhibit scale free power law like behavior,
though an accurate determination of the precise func-
tional form (and precise values of the exponents) is un-
fortunately not possible. The behavior of p(t) for K = 2
for large N appears to be consistent with p(t) ∼ t−α for
α ≃ 1.4. The behavior of p(a) for K = 2 for large N
appears to consistent with p(a) ∼ a−β for β ≃ 1.2. The
behavior of the Non-Darwinian version of the network
is similar as shown in the figures. Hence the Darwinian
move is not crucial for the existence of the power law like
behavior of p(t) and p(a). Nevertheless we shall see be-
low that the Darwinian selective move has a significant
effect on the characteristics of the agents. A transient
and corresponding first occurrence of periodic attractor
make up a test cycle. We find that the distribution of
test cycles also appears to be power law like. Notice that
in order to find the largest observations in Fig. 1 we it-
erated the network more than the maximum number of
updates of a test cycle and then reentered the state at
104 updates to perform the Darwinian update.
We define the lifetime l of an agent as the number of
updates survived at the moment the agent is removed
from the system. As exhibited in Fig. 2 we find that un-
der Darwinian updating the network develops what ap-
pears to be a power law like distribution of lifetimes p(l)
with increasing system size, consistent with p(l) ∼ l−γ
for γ ≃ 0.9. Notably the magnitude of the power law
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FIG. 1: The probability of the length of transients (top curve)
and attractors (bottom curve) for different systems sizes N .
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FIG. 2: The probability of the number of updates agents
survive for different system sizes N .
exponent is smaller than one. Since test cycles are nu-
merically truncated at a finite length of 104 updates, the
distribution of lifetimes is somewhat distorted for lengths
longer than the numerical cutoff. Because of logarithmic
binning the effect is not visible in Fig. 2. We find that
for all considered values of N = 64, 128 and 1024 the
lifetime distribution for the Non-Darwinian model (the
circles in Fig. 2) are approximately linear as function of
the logarithm of the argument, i.e. not at all described
by a power law.
Next we address the behavior of the agents in the sta-
tionary critical state. We denote by the lifetime yield
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5 x 10
6
Lifetime Yield
Lif
eti
me
FIG. 3: The correlation between lifetime and lifetime yield for
the Darwinian model (stars) and the Non-Darwinian model
(circles). N = 1024.
of an agent the score averaged over the lifetime of the
agent. The yield of an agent characterizes the efficiency
of the agent’s phenotypical behavior. Fig. 3 shows that
longevity is directly related to near zero values of the
agent’s lifetime yield. Thus the selective pressure on the
agents in the model leads to a finely tuned ecology, where
agents tend to avoid winning too much, which might in-
duce annihilation of their partners. Instead agents man-
age to keep their partners and live long by entering into
near neutral patterns.
Fig. 4 is a histogram of yield accumulated over en-
tire test cicles of the Darwinian and benchmark ecologies
respectively. The accumulated yield of an agent is the
average score of the agent over the length of his life so
far. (Notice that agents were not born at the same time.)
The standard deviation δY of the distribution of accumu-
lated yield is a measure of the equality in success in the
network. We find a smaller δY in the Darwinian ecology
for all considered system sizes N = 128, 256 and 1024.
Indeed, one would expect that removal of the worst
performing agents should reduce the abundance of poorly
performing agents with large negative average scores.
But we observe that the abundance of well performing
agents with large positive scores is also somewhat re-
duced. In the Darwinian model agents are thus clustered
around the zero score. Notice that given opposing in-
terests of agents, the collected environment of an agent
receives the same score as the agent but with opposite
sign. In the Darwinian model, agents are therefore sim-
ilar to their respective environments in terms of success.
An interesting property of e.g. the Minority Game (MG)
model is that any favorable configuration for a particular
agent is inherently unstable as other agents act to reverse
the situation [6]. A similar situation holds for LDN as
well but unlike MG the environments of the agents are
heterogeneous.
Let us now describe in more detail how the agents man-
age to achieve low absolute scores and thereby survive
many test cycles. For the benchmark and Darwinian
model respectively, we have investigated the switching
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FIG. 4: Histogram of accumulated yields for the Darwinian
model (stars) and the Non-Darwinian model (circles). N =
1024.
activity of the agents. By a switch we mean the change
from sending signal 0 to 1 or vice versa. By a distinct
switching activity we mean a certain observed number
of switches of one or more agents over a test cycle. The
number W (N, t + a) of observed distinct activities can-
not be larger than the number of agents in the ecology
N nor the length of the test cycle (t+a). We have inves-
tigated the dependence of W on (t + a) for system sizes
N = 128, 256 and 1024. We find that for all cycle lengths
2 ≤ (t+a) < 104, the Darwinian ecology exhibits a larger
ratio W/(t + a). This may suggest that the Darwinian
updating of the network produces a greater variety of
phenotypes.
We now discuss the robustness of the model. Increas-
ing the number of opponents per agent does not appear
to change the test cycle distribution. We do not observe
criticality in case the input wiring of the agents is un-
changed as the agents are replaced. We point out that,
in general, testing the stationarity of the model is numeri-
cally challenging. One can consider an alternative version
of the network where the homogeneity parameter is not
fixed. In this situation, PBC find that when agents com-
pete globally, the homogeneity parameter self-organizes
to a distinct value as the network enters a critical state
[8]. In contrast, for the LDN model we find that the ho-
mogeneity parameter decreases from the initial unbiased
value making the transients and periodic orbits very long,
tough still, perhaps, power law distributed. This version
of the model is difficult to handle numerically.
As pointed out by PBC, an interesting question is –
what games lead to complex, scale free states under Dar-
winian selection? We speculate that the game should in-
herently prevent agents from achieving mutual gain while
allowing the losing agents to improve their unfavorable
situation by a change of behavior.
We suggest that the ”coin-guessing” game of the LDN
model is a suitable representation of such situations
where agents tend to become equal in strength to their
opponents implying their exact ”task” becomes irrele-
vant. For example, the game is similar to many situations
in the business world, e.g. the trade of a stock involv-
ing one seller and one buyer. From a dynamical point
of view, it is significant that either the buyer or seller in
a trade will necessarily become a winner and the other
agent a loser as the price of the stock diverges from its
value when the deal was made. (If the price of the stock
goes up the seller would have been better off on the other
side of the trade). As in the LDN model, the determinant
of who is the winner is of complex dynamical origin.
The score distribution of the Darwinian model might
be compared to e.g. the distribution of performances
of fund managers. Interestingly, extensive investigations
have given little evidence that fund managers can consis-
tently beat relevant market indexes (see p. 368 in [9]).
Similarly, the LDN model has the property that success-
ful agents tend to be short-lived.
We have presented a Local Darwinian Network model
which exhibits critical behavior without global interac-
tions. The model demonstrates that – given that agents
act under opposing interest with their respective environ-
ments – Darwinian phenotypical selection of the worst
performer together with genotype mutations can lead
to an ecology where the distribution of lifetimes lacks
a characteristic scale. The agents of the emergent ecol-
ogy are heterogeneous with respect to their activity but
in terms of success they are nearly equal to their respec-
tive environments. Longevity is achieved by adapting to
a near neutral yield which ensures the stability of the
fellow partners.
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